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Abstract 
The influence of authoritarianism, social dominance, and ingroup identification on 
ingroup favoritism and outgroup discrimination in a minimal group paradigm were 
investigated in this study. Possible effects of majority and minority group size 
interactions with these constructs were also examined. It has been previously shown 
that right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981) and social dominance orientation 
(Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) influence ingroup favoritism and 
outgroup discrimination in Tajfel's (1978) minimal group paradigm (McFarland & 
Ageyev, 1992; Perrault & Bourhis, 1999; Sidanius, Pratto, & Mitchell, 1994). 
Majority and minority group status also influence behavior in minimal groups (Gerard 
& Hoyt, 1974; Otten, Mummendey, & Blanz, 1996; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1984; Simon 
& Brown, 1987). Based on motivational differences between authoritarianism and 
social dominance, individuals higher in authoritarianism were expected to display 
greater ingroup favoritism than those lower in authoritarianism, regardless of group 
size. Social dominance was expected to interact with group size such that individuals 
higher on this dimension in minority groups would identify less with the ingroup, as 
v 
opposed to those in majority groups who would identify more, and display less 
favoritism toward the ingroup than those in majority groups. 
To create minimal groups, participants completed an estimation task and were 
told that their scores indicated they were either "overestimators" or "underestimators." 
Three conditions were established: Neutral (group size was unspecified), majority (one 
group was identified as being numerically large), and minority (one group was 
identified as being numerically small). Trait ratings (Thompson & Crocker, 1990) and 
Tajfel's (1978) resource allocation task were used to measure ingroup favoritism. 
Participants overall displayed ingroup favoritism on both dependent measures, 
although parity was used most on the Tajfel (1978) matrices. Neither 
authoritarianism, social dominance, nor any interaction between these constructs and 
group size significantly affected trait ratings. On the matrices, authoritarianism led to 
favoritism on only one of the six pull scores and did not interact with group size. 
Social dominance led those in the neutral condition to display greater ingroup 
favoritism. Contrary to predictions, social dominance led those in majority groups to 
select parity over favoritism, but did not affect those in minority groups. Finally, 
ingroup identification mediated the relationship between social dominance and ingroup 
favoritism on the trait ratings for those in neutral and minority groups, though not in 
the predicted direction. Those in minority groups gave more positive trait ratings to 
the ingroup rather than to the majority outgroup as their identification with the 
ingroup increased. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1981,1988, 1996) and the social 
dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), while 
independent of each other (Pratto et al.,1994), are both strong predictors of prejudice 
and ethnocentrism (Altemeyer, 1998; McFarland & Adelson, 1996). As stated by 
Pratto et al., (1994), authoritarians and social dominants are thought to be "relatively 
conservative, racist, ethnocentric, and prejudiced, and they should show little empathy 
for lower status others" (p.744). Authoritarians and social dominants consistently 
display ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation toward a broad spectrum of real 
groups, including women, homosexuals, and ethnic groups (Altemeyer, 1998; 
Duncan, Peterson, & Winter, 1997; McFarland & Adelson, 1996, 1997; Pratto et al., 
1994; Whitley, 1998, 1999). 
Recently, research has shown that authoritarianism and social dominance may 
explain a proportion of the variance of ingroup favoritism and outgroup discrimination 
that occurs within the context of Tajfel's (1978) minimal group paradigm (McFarland 
& Ageyev, 1992; Perrault & Bourhis, 1999; Sidanius, Pratto, & Mitchell, 1994). 
Tajfel's (1978) minimal group paradigm, where individuals are arbitrarily assigned to 
groups and asked to allocate resources to anonymous ingroup and outgroup members, 
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provides a unique opportunity to assess the degree of ingroup favoritism and 
outgroup discrimination that individuals display. However, to date there has not been 
a direct comparison of the influence of both authoritarianism and social dominance 
orientation on the dependent measures commonly used in minimal groups. 
Majority and minority group size also influences behavior in minimal groups. 
Knowledge of one's group size in relation to the outgroup can accentuate an 
individual's need to preserve a positive social identity when in the minority. 
Furthermore, differences in group size affect perceptions of group homogeneity, 
especially among those in minority groups (Gerard & Hoyt, 1974; Otten, 
Mummendey, & Blanz, 1996; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1984; Simon & Brown, 1987). 
Because SDO is based on maintaining group hierarchies, the status of being a high 
SDO in a minority group appears likely to intensify the competition between social 
identity needs and social dominance needs for these individuals, possibly inducing 
greater identification with the outgroup, and consequently reducing or eliminating 
ingroup favoritism (Levin & Sidanius, 1999). Authoritarians, however, are motivated 
by the desire to maintain their traditional values and moral superiority (Altemeyer, 
1981, 1988, 1996). These individuals are expected to display ingroup favoritism 
regardless of relative group size. The present study, therefore, will examine whether 
authoritarianism and social dominance orientation affect ingroup favoritism within a 
minimal group paradigm and whether group size has any effect on the degree to which 
these individuals identify with the ingroup and hence display ingroup favoritism. 
3 
Literature Review 
This review of the research begins with an explanation of social identity theory 
and how discrimination is manifested within minimal groups. Next, results from 
studies of right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation within a 
minimal group setting are reviewed. Finally, the possibility that a majority or minority 
group size condition may especially influence the behavior of individuals higher in 
SDO in a minimal group situation will be discussed. 
Social Identity Theory (SIT) 
According to social identity theory (SIT), group membership confers a social 
identity upon the individual. This social identity in turn leads to an accentuation of the 
differences between the individual's ingroup and outgroups. To the extent that these 
differences are perceived as positive, the individual's self-esteem is enhanced. Ingroup 
favoritism and outgroup derogation are the mechanisms by which self-esteem is 
enhanced through making more favorable comparisons of the ingroup over the 
outgroup. 
This phenomenon is strikingly manifested within the minimal group paradigm 
(Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). In a typical minimal group 
experiment, individuals are arbitrarily assigned to groups, ostensibly on the basis of 
their performance on an estimation task or aesthetic preferences. For example, 
participants may be asked to estimate the number of dots on a screen, and are then 
divided arbitrarily into fictitious groups of either "overestimators" or 
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"underestimators" (Tajfel, 1970). Individual participants may also be grouped 
according to their preference for a work of art, with arbitrary names given to the 
groups (e.g., the blue group and the green group; Downing & Monaco, 1985; 
Moscovici & Paicheler, 1978). Sometimes groups are based simply on the toss of a 
coin (Sachdev & Bourhis, 1984). No social interaction occurs within or between 
groups, and no suggestion is made that there are qualitative differences between the 
groups. Despite the absence of any implied or actual competition between the groups, 
this simple categorization is sufficient to elicit intergroup discrimination (Brewer, 
1979; Diehl, 1990; Tajfel, 1981). 
Two types of measures of intergroup discrimination are typically used: resource 
allocation and trait ratings. In Tajfel's (1970) original resource allocation task, 
participants select one pair of numbers from among 13 pairs which awards points to a 
member of the ingroup and the corresponding number of points to a member of the 
outgroup. Often, these points are said to represent a quantity of money or extra credit 
for participation. The pairs are arranged such that participants can use varying 
strategies of allocation. Parity (P) awards an equal number of points to ingroup and 
outgroup members. In choosing maximum joint profit (MJP), participants maximize 
the total combined number of points awarded to the ingroup and outgroup recipients, 
regardless of equality or which group receives more points. The strategy of maximum 
ingroup profit (MIP) awards the highest absolute number of points to ingroup 
members, regardless of the amount awarded to the outgroup. Finally, maximum 
5 
differentiation (MD) is the least economically rational choice, maximizing the 
difference in points awarded to the ingroup and the outgroup, despite sacrificing 
maximum ingroup profit to do so. Ingroup favoritism (FAV) is the combination of 
MIP + MD. A negative FAV and negative MD imply outgroup favoritism (OF), 
negative MJP indicates minimum joint profit, and negative MIP means minimum 
ingroup profit (see Bourhis, Sachdev, & Gagnon, 1994). 
Brewer and Silver (1978) developed a similar allocation measure which permits a 
choice of point distributions that results in either relative gain, own gain, joint gain, or 
equality. McFarland and Ageyev (1992) found that ingroup favoritism scores on the 
Tajfel (1970) and Brewer and Silver (1978) measures were significantly correlated, 
L=.59, in their sample. 
When asked to allocate resources (i.e., money, extra points) between an 
anonymous member of one's ingroup and an anonymous member of the outgroup, 
many participants clearly favor the ingroup and allocate greater resources to the 
ingroup member. This occurs even though the individual making the allocation does 
not directly benefit from the ingroup favoritism (Brewer & Silver, 1978; Tajfel, 1970; 
Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). In this way, participants are able to achieve a 
positive social identity, which is then translated into higher self-esteem (Lemeyer & 
Smith, 1985; Oakes & Turner, 1980; Tajfel, 1978, 1981). It is the desire for a positive 
self-image that appears to provide the impetus for making distinctions between the 
ingroup and the outgroup: "To the extent that the ingroup is perceived as both 
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different and better than the outgroup, thereby achieving positive distinctiveness, one's 
social identity is enhanced" (Hogg & Abrams, 1990, p.3). 
The second type of dependent measure, trait ratings, usually consists of evaluating 
an anonymous member of one's ingroup and an anonymous member of the outgroup 
on the basis of social and personality dimensions. For example, in Thompson and 
Crocker's (1990) minimal group study, participants rated themselves, an anonymous 
member of their ingroup, and an anonymous member of the outgroup on six positive 
and negative social dimension traits (friendly, rude, etc.) and six intellectual traits 
(intelligent, stupid, etc.). Single scores were calculated for the positive traits and the 
negative traits, respectively, by summing the ratings in each category. A difference 
score was then obtained, with higher scores indicating more positive evaluations. The 
overall results indicated that participants rated ingroup members more favorably than 
they did members of the outgroup. 
However, because social identity theory focuses totally on the forces of 
intergroup dynamics and gives little credence to individual personality variables, very 
little research has been conducted on how individual differences influence 
discrimination in minimal groups. Nevertheless, there is now evidence that both 
authoritarianism and social dominance enhance our understanding of ingroup 
favoritism and outgroup derogation by identifying the type of individuals most likely to 
discriminate in minimal groups. 
7 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Minimal Groups 
Authoritarianism was first proposed as an effort to explain the rise of Fascism in 
the 1930s (Fromm, 1941). Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950) 
devised the first measure of authortarianism, the Fascism scale (F-scale) as a measure 
of the "enduring psychological dispositions" (p. 223) underlying ethnocentrism, 
stereotypy, conventionalism, concern with power, and antidemocratic attitudes. 
Adorno et al. (1950) believed authoritarianism was best explained by the 
psychodynamic principles of repressed anger and feelings of inadequacy in adulthood 
resulting from childhood experiences of punitiveness and a lack of open affection from 
parents. This psychodynamic interpretation presumes that aggressive feelings toward 
the parental authority are redirected toward a safe alternative, i.e., a minority group, 
rather than toward the source of the repressed anger, the parent. 
However, methodological and conceptual problems caused the F-scale to fall out 
of favor. Taking a new approach, Altemeyer (1981) resurrected the construct in the 
form of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA). His balanced RWA scale measures three 
clusters of attitudes: a) authoritarian submission to established authorities and the 
social norms they endorse, b) authoritarian aggressiveness toward outgroups, 
especially when the aggressiveness is sanctioned by the established authority, and c) 
adherence to social conventions perceived to be endorsed by both society and its 
established authorities. Altemeyer (1981) has presented evidence supporting the view 
that authoritarianism is acquired through social-learning processes rather than 
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stemming from psychodynamic origins. 
Basically, authoritarians divide the world into ingroups and outgroups. 
Authoritarians perceive outgroups as threatening to traditional or conventional values. 
By engaging in derogation of the outgroup, authoritarians are able to defend against 
the threat the outgroup poses to these values. The tendency for authoritarians to 
display ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation toward a broad spectrum of real 
groups has been found in many studies ( e.g., Altemeyer, 1998; Duncan, Peterson, & 
Winter, 1997; McFarland & Adelson, 1996, 1997; Whitley, 1998, 1999). 
Evidence also suggests that authoritarianism affects discrimination within the 
context of the minimal group paradigm. Using a manipulation similar to a minimal 
group experiment, Downing and Monaco (1985) asked participants to rate the average 
performance of members of their ingroup and of members of the outgroup after 
receiving skiing instructions. They permitted three levels of interaction between 
experimental groups: groups given instruction together, groups instructed together but 
physically separated by a small distance with separate practice areas, and groups 
separated for both instruction and practice. High authoritarians (those above the mean 
of their sample) rated in-group members more favorably and outgroup members less 
favorably than did those low in authoritarianism. Furthermore, as the degree of 
contact between the ingroup and outgroup increased, so did the ingroup favoritism of 
the high authoritarians. Low authoritarians did not discriminate between ingroup and 
outgroup suggesting that only high authoritarians discriminate in minimal groups. 
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In a conference paper, McFarland and Ageyev (1992) proposed that high 
authoritarians would display ingroup favoritism to enhance their self-esteem to a 
greater degree than would low and middle authoritarians. McFarland and Ageyev 
(1992) used all three dependent measures of minimal group discrimination: a) Tajfel's 
(1970) resource allocation task, b) Brewer & Silver's (1978) resource allocation task, 
and c) Thompson & Crocker's (1990) trait-rating task. These authors found 
substantial ingroup favoritism among all participants in an American sample. This 
result was particularly significant on the two resource allocation tasks (which were 
standardized and summed for use as a composite dependent variable). The 
standardized means on the resource allocation measure were -.34, .08, and .53 for 
low, middle, and high authoritarians, respectively, with a main effect for 
authoritarianism, F (2, 152) = 5.46, g < .005, indicating that high authoritarians 
discriminated more than middles or low authoritarians. A comparable Russian sample 
contained no high authoritarians, preventing a parallel analysis. 
Interestingly, the order of tasks had a pronounced effect. In general, the 
presentation of the trait-rating task prior to the allocation tasks seemed to make the 
group distinction highly salient, such that authoritarianism more strongly influenced 
assigning awards to the ingroup. Ingroup favoritism was enhanced for high 
authoritarians while that of low authoritarians actually decreased when the trait-rating 
task was completed first. Overall, when group distinctions were made more salient by 
the trait-rating task, authoritarianism accounted for 16.5% of the variance in ingroup 
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favoritism on the Tajfel (1970) and Brewer and Silver (1978) composite measure. 
Furthermore, the standardized Tajfel-Brewer ingroup favoritism measure correlated r 
= .41, p< .05 with the Sherwood self-esteem scale for high authoritarians, but only .02 
and -.17, ns, for low and middle authoritarians, providing support for their hypothesis 
that high authoritarians use ingroup favoritism for the purposes of self-esteem 
enhancement, but low or middle authoritarians do not. 
Only one published study has investigated a relationship between authoritarianism 
and ingroup favoritism in the minimal group paradigm. As part of a study identifying 
factors influencing the strength of group identification and subsequent ingroup 
favoritism, Perreault and Bourhis (1999) hypothesized that authoritarianism, 
ethnocentrism, and personal need for structure would enhance identification with the 
ingroup and would ultimately lead to greater discrimination in a minimal group setting. 
They discovered that none of the three personality variables significantly correlated 
directly with discrimination. Path analysis, however, indicated that individuals higher 
in ethnocentrisn were more likely to identify strongly with their ingroup, and the 
degree of ingroup identification significantly correlated with discriminatory behavior. 
In short, ethnocentrism was a factor in discrimination to the extent that it led to 
greater ingroup identification. However, Perreault and Bourhis (1999) also point out 
that authoritarianism was significantly correlated with ethnocentrism in their study, 
implying that the ethnocentric nature of authoritarians may influence their greater 
degree of identification with the ingroup, leading them to increased discriminatory 
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behavior. 
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Minimal Groups 
SDO is a measure of anti-egalitarian values and a preference for stable between-
group hierarchies. Though not conceptualized as a personality variable per se, it is a 
stable individual difference. Pratto et. al. (1994) state that SDO is "a general 
attitudinal orientation toward intergroup relations, reflecting whether one generally 
prefers such relations to be equal, versus hierarchical, that is, ordered along a superior-
inferior dimension" (p.742). Consequently, people high in SDO favor group-based 
inequality and hierarchy-enhancing ideologies and policies, whereas people low in 
SDO prefer equality between groups and hierarchy-attenuating ideologies and policies. 
SDO consistently correlates with scales assessing opposition to social policies 
designed to promote equality and racial programs (i.e., affirmative action) and various 
groups' civil rights (Pratto et al, 1994). 
As for the influence of social dominance in a minimal group setting, Sidanius, 
Pratto, and Mitchell (1994) found that social dominance orientation interacted with the 
degree of ingroup identification to affect differential intergroup evaluations (DIE), 
a difference between ratings of the ingroup and outgroup on four items (able, 
intelligent, stupid and incompetent). Analysis of the resulting interaction revealed that 
participants with both high levels of identification with the ingroup and high levels of 
social dominance orientation were more likely to evaluate the ingroup as more 
competent than the outgroup. 
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Sidanius et al. (1994) combined DIE with indices of social distance and group 
cooperation, referring to the assorted behaviors as differential intergroup social 
allocations (DISAs). Participants with both greater ingroup identification and higher 
in SDO allocated greater social value to the ingroup than to the outgroup. Results 
also revealed that the greater the social dominance orientation of participants, the 
more they displayed a desire for social distance from the outgroup and the less willing 
they were to cooperate with the outgroup. These tendencies were significant even 
after the effects of gender, self-esteem, and ingroup identification were controlled. 
Majority/Minority Group Size in a Minimal Group Paradigm 
While evidence suggests group size influences discriminatory behavior, there is 
ambiguity with regard to the direction of this influence. This direction seems to rest 
upon the possible positive and/or negative evaluations individuals make about being a 
member of a majority or minority group. 
Gerard and Hoyt (1974) first manipulated group size in minimal groups. They 
hypothesized that as ingroup size decreases relative to the outgroup, distinctiveness 
increases and favorable ingroup evaluations are enhanced. Participants in their study 
were arbitrarily assigned to groups of "overestimators" and "underestimators" on the 
basis of a dot estimation task. The authors further suggested to participants that their 
responses to the dot estimation task conveyed information about their personality 
characteristics. Participants were instructed, however, that neither group was superior 
to the other. Group size was manipulated by varying the number of individuals in the 
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ingroup such that there were either 2, 5, or 8 persons in the ingroup out of a possible 
10 participants per session, with ingroup category (overestimator or underestimator) 
counterbalanced. 
Modifying the usual trait-evaluation task, Gerard and Hoyt (1974) asked 
participants to write an essay about a painting and told them they would subsequently 
evaluate an essay from another ingroup member and from an outgroup member. 
Actually, participants evaluated bogus essays, randomly labeled as an ingroup or an 
outgroup essay. They were then asked to form an impression of and evaluate the 
writer on seven characteristics: warm/cold, creative/uncreative, strong/weak, 
intelligent/unintelligent, talented/untalented, definite/wishy-washy, and 
honest/dishonest. 
While results were mixed, there was some support for Gerard and Hoyt's (1974) 
proposition that group size influences ingroup favoritism. Participants' evaluations of 
the essays did not indicate significant ingroup bias, but their trait assessments of the 
supposed writer did. As ingroup size decreased from 8 to 5 to 2 persons, ingroup 
writers were assigned more favorable traits than outgroup writers. In fact, when 
ingroup/outgroup sizes were equal or the ingroup was in the majority, outgroup bias 
actually occurred. 
Moscovici and Paicheler (1978), on the other hand, did not find the minority 
group condition to elicit greater ingroup favoritism. These authors used a somewhat 
different manipulation of group size, however. Participants were divided into groups 
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ostensibly on the basis of their preferences for one of two paintings. They were then 
told that their preferences placed them either with 81.8% of the total participant 
population (majority condition) or among 18.2% of the total participant population 
(minority condition). A Tajfel resource allocation task was used to assess ingroup 
favoritism. They found that those in majority groups were more discriminatory toward 
outgroups than were those in minority groups. 
Sachdev and Bourhis (1984) suggested that the differences in operationalizing the 
majority/minority condition were at the root of the discrepancy in results between the 
Gerard and Hoyt (1974) and Moscovici and Paicheler (1978) studies, because of the 
possibility that participants made different subjective evaluations about their group 
assignments. Specifically, participants in Gerard and Hoyt's (1974) study may have 
judged the majority as having more normal personality characteristics than the 
minority. In the case of Moscovici and Paicheler's (1978) study, participants may 
have considered the majority opinion with regard to painting preference as more right 
and the opposing opinion of the minority more threatening. Sachdev and Bourhis 
(1984) hypothesized that "since minority group membership confers a relatively 
insecure and negative social identity, minorities should show more discrimination and 
less fairness than majorities" (p.47). 
Sachdev and Bourhis (1984), therefore, sought to evaluate any difference that 
might occur as a result of differences in the method of group assignment (truly 
arbitrary or anonymous). The effects of saliency of group categorization on 
15 
intergroup behavior and participant's perceptions of being in a majority, equal, or 
minority group were analyzed. Group assignments were made on the basis of a coin 
toss to eliminate any subjective evaluations that participants might have made about 
the basis for their group assignments as in Gerard and Hoyt's (1974) or Moscovici and 
Paicheler's (1978) studies. Sachdev and Bourhis (1984) found that both minorities and 
majorities showed significant discrimination, but majorities were more fair toward 
minorities than vice versa. These results were interpreted as supporting the social 
identity theory argument that minorities show more discrimination and less fairness 
than majorities because of the relatively insecure and negative social identity posed by 
the minority group membership. Majority group members can afford to be fair 
towards minorities because the group membership is perceived as more secure and 
positive. 
The suggestion made by Sachdev and Bourhis (1984) that being labeled a 
minority carries a connotation of a negative image of either abnormality or wrongness 
and thus is a threat to a person's self-esteem was further examined in a study by Simon 
and Brown (1987). Simon and Brown (1987) argued that people belonging to a 
minority group not only engage in discrimination in order to strengthen a positive 
social identity but also perceive more homogeneity within the ingroup as a protective 
mechanism to accentuate their positive social identity. They asserted that the 
perception of greater ingroup similarity enhances the subjective feeling of the ingroup 
as an entity in and of itself, whereas the outgroup, being perceived as less 
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homogenous, is less inclusive of its membership. The result is that being a member of 
the minority ingroup is judged superior to membership in the outgroup because of the 
sense of community that the ingroup provides. 
Otten, Mummendey, and Blanz (1996) obtained similar results. They studied the 
effects of status, along with group size, and the use of both positive and negative 
resource allocations (money or unpleasant tasks.) These authors found that 
threatening participants' positive social identity by assigning them to an inferior status 
group or a minority group led them to display increased levels of favoritism to the 
ingroup over the outgroup in the allocation of both positive (money) and negative 
(unpleasant tasks) resource allocations. 
But suppose an individual is oriented to seek membership in high status groups 
and to support policies that promote high status groups over low status groups? What 
influence, if any, might being in a minority have on someone high in social dominance? 
Would we find that high social dominants perceive a negative connotation associated 
with minority classification, fail to identify strongly with the ingroup, and thus display 
outgroup favoritism in an attempt to share in the superior image of the majority? 
Levin and Sidanius (1999) suggested this is often the case with real groups, at 
least in the case of ingroup and outgroup affect. They examined the relationships 
between ingroup identification, SDO, and ingroup/outgroup affect among Whites and 
Latinos in the United States, as well as among Ashkenazim/Mizrachim and Jews/Arabs 
in Israel. Specifically, they proposed that people high in social dominance in high-
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status groups (Whites, Ashkenazim, and Jews) would identify more with the 
ingroup than high social dominants in low-status groups (Latinos, Mizrachim, and 
Arabs). Furthermore, they proposed group members high in social dominance would 
display more positive affect toward high-status groups and more negative affect 
toward low-status groups, regardless of their group membership. Finally, status and 
SDO were expected to interact so that members of high status groups who were also 
high in social dominance would exhibit more positive affect toward the ingroup and 
more negative affect toward the outgroup. Members of low status groups who were 
high in social dominance were expected to exhibit more negative ingroup affect and 
more positive outgroup affect. 
Ingroup identification was measured by the items "To what extent do you identify 
with other members of your group?" and "To what extent do you feel close to other 
members of your group (p. 107)7' The items were evaluated using a 7- point scale 
from 1 (a very small extent) to 7 (a very large extent). Participants were also asked to 
indicate how positively or negatively they felt toward their ingroup and the relevant 
outgroup for purposes of measuring group affect, again on a 7-point scale. A single 
item assessed perceived status of different groups within each society, essentially 
asking participants to rate how most people in their society view the status of the other 
group. Whites in the United States were perceived as higher in status than Latinos in 
accordance with expectations. Likewise, Jews were perceived higher in social status 
than Arabs, and Ashkenazim received higher status ratings than Mizrachim (although 
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this gap was smaller than the other two conditions). 
Results supported Levin and Sidanius's (1999) hypotheses. In the high status 
groups (Whites, Ashkenazim, and Jews), higher social dominance was positively 
related to degree of ingroup identification and affect and negatively related to 
outgroup affect. Levin and Sidanius write ". . . these are effective strategies for 
reinforcing the dominant position of the ingroup in society" (p.l 19). The effect of 
SDO on ingroup affect was mediated by ingroup identification such that high SDO led 
to stronger ingroup identification, which led, in turn, to more positive ingroup affect. 
The authors proposed that these differential effects on ingroup and outgroup affect 
may be explained by both social identity needs as well as social dominance needs. 
High status group members may satisfy the former need through ingroup favoritism 
and the latter through derogation of the outgroup. This further suggests that the 
differences in ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation that occur in group setting 
may be a result of two separate processes, at least among high-status group members. 
The results for low status groups were somewhat mixed. For Latinos and Arabs, 
high SDO was associated with more negative ingroup affect for these two groups, but 
there was not a direct relationship between SDO and more positive outgroup affect. 
For Latinos, there emerged an indirect relationship between SDO and positive 
outgroup affect such that higher SDO Latinos identified less with their ingroup, which 
led to more positive affect toward Whites. High SDO Arabs, on the other hand, while 
displaying less identification with the ingroup, nevertheless did not exhibit more 
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positive affect toward Jews. This difference between Latinos and Arabs, explain Levin 
and Sidanius, may be due to the differences in the degree of stability and legitimacy of 
the ethnic stratification that occurs in the United States and Israel. 
To interpret these results, the authors proposed that high SDOs in low status 
groups are unable to simultaneously meet social dominance needs and social identity 
needs. Instead, the low status condition threatens high SDO's positive social identity 
to the point that it supersedes social dominance needs and, as a consequence, high 
SDO individuals identify less with their inferior group in order to overcome the threat 
to positive social identity posed by the low status condition. 
For the Mizrachim, SDO had no effect on ingroup identification or group affect. 
Levin and Sidanius (1999) point out that specific religious characteristics of this group 
may be responsible for the discrepancy. Also, the distinctions between the 
Ashkenazim and Mizrachim may not have been great enough for social dominance 
needs to be triggered. 
Levin and Sidanius's (1999) results suggest that SDO differentially influences the 
degree of ingroup identification and ingroup/outgroup affect, depending upon the 
majority/minority status of one's group. That the groups in their study could be 
defined not only by their relative status as inferior/superior but also by their 
majority/minority position, suggests that group size alone may be enough to 
exacerbate the competition between social identity needs and social dominance needs. 
Those individuals high in SDO, but in a minority, may display less ingroup 
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identification and, as a result, engage in outgroup favoritism. Levin and Sidanius 
(1999) suggest that the salience of the social-status difference may be an important 
variable in determining whether social dominance needs are preeminent. 
In summary, both authoritarianism and social dominance enhance ingroup 
favoritism and outgroup discrimination against real groups. Recent research suggests 
they may also do the same in minimal groups, except for high SDO's in minority group 
groups. However, the underlying motives for the two types of individuals differ. 
While authoritarians are motivated to establish and maintain their moral superiority, 
social dominance reflects a concern for maintaining group hierarchies. As a result, the 
extent to which SDO's identify with their ingroup may be affected by the size of their 
ingroup. Individuals higher in SDO who find themselves in a majority group should 
display greater ingroup favoritism and outgroup discrimination than those higher in 
SDO and in a minority group. Authoritarians should not be affected by group size. 
Hypotheses 
On the basis of the aforementioned research and findings, the following 
hypotheses are proposed. 
1. Overall, participants will display ingroup favoritism as measured by a) trait 
ratings and b) resource allocations within minimal groups. 
2. A main effect of authoritarianism should occur such that individuals higher in 
authoritarianism display greater ingroup favoritism than those lower in 
authoritarianism, regardless of group size. 
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3. An interaction between group size and social dominance will occur, with the 
pattern of the interaction indicating that SDO enhances ingroup favoritism and 
discrimination against outgroups for individuals in majority groups, while SDO 
reduces the levels of ingroup favoritism and enhances outgroup discrimination 
in minority groups. 
4. Identification with the ingroup is expected to mediate the relationship between 
social dominance orientation and ingroup favoritism in minority groups. 
Specifically, individuals higher in social dominance in a minority group will 
exhibit less identification with the ingroup and display less ingroup favoritism. 
Further analyses will examine the relationship between RWA, SDO, and self-
esteem enhancement. Effects of task order and gender will also be investigated. 
Chapter Two 
Method 
Participants 
Data were collected from 310 students (116 males and 194 females) enrolled in 
undergraduate psychology classes at Western Kentucky University. The sample was 
comprised of 85.8% Whites, 10.6% Blacks, with Asians, Hispanics, and various others 
making up the remaining 3.6%. The majority of students were freshman (66%), and 
aged 18-21 (89.7%). Participants received extra credit for their participation and a 
chance to receive one of three monetary awards of $10.00. 
Procedures 
Students were recruited in their classes to participate in a study of decision-
making processes in individuals. All sessions were conducted on campus, outside of 
class, and lasted approximately one hour. Between 10 and 30 students were recruited 
for each session. Because the experiment was conducted over a period of two weeks, 
participants were not debriefed immediately in order not to confound the results from 
later sessions. The experimenter informed participants that once all sessions had been 
completed, she would return to their class and explain the research in full. 
After obtaining written informed consent, participants were asked to provide a 
four-digit identification number of their choosing, such as the last four digits of their 
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social security number, phone number, or pin number, for the purposes of matching 
materials and preserving anonymity. 
Participants were then asked to engage in an estimation task. This task was used 
as a prelude to the minimal group paradigm. The experimenter explained the 
procedures as follows: 
We will be asking you to engage in a number of decision-making tasks. 
The first one is an estimation task. You are asked to estimate the number 
of beans in a 64 ounce jar; the weight of a solid steel bar, approximately 15 
inches in length; the distance around the outer perimeter walkway of 
Downing University Center on the campus of Western Kentucky University, 
and the amount of time passed in silence with your eyes closed. 
Participants were provided with an answer sheet and pencil. They were instructed to 
write the four-digit number provided earlier at the top of the answer sheet. Two to six 
assistants took the estimation responses into another room, ostensibly for scoring 
purposes. 
Participants were told that for the purposes of assessing other types of decisions 
and for ease in coding, they would be grouped on the basis of the judgements they had 
just made on the estimation task. In reality, individuals were randomly assigned to one 
of two groups, overestimators or underestimators. While waiting for the assistants to 
return, participants were asked to respond to a questionnaire entitled A Survey of 
Attitudes and Beliefs (see Appendix A). It included the following: 
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1. A 12-item RWA scale, condensed by McFarland, Ageyev, and Abalakina 
(1993), from Altemeyer's (1998) 30-item measure. In the current study, the 
reliability of this scale was a = .78. 
2. The 16-item SDO scale (Pratto et al., 1994). The reliability of the SDO scale in 
this sample was a=88. 
3. Heatherton and Polivy's (1991) State Self-esteem Scale (SSES), a well-
validated measure of social, appearance, and performance self-esteem. For the 
purposes of this study, only the 14 items related to social and performance 
esteem were used. The reliability of the SSES in the present study was 
ol= .86. 
For purposes unrelated to this thesis, the following were also included on the 
measure: 
A. The empathetic concern and perspective taking subscales of Davis's (1983) 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (14 items) measure feelings of sympathy and 
a cognitive tendency to take the perspective of others. 
B. A 12-item balanced ethnocentrism scale, adapted by McFarland (1999), 
from Altemeyer's Manitoba Prejudice Scale (Altemeyer, 1998). The scale 
measures a general rejection of a number of outgroups, including Russians, 
Indians, Japanese, Arabs, Asians, foreign (i.e., non-Christian) religions, and 
foreign refugees. 
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A 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) was used 
for each scale. Responses were made on a scantron sheet. Questions assessing gender, 
ethnic heritage, age, and class in school were included. 
After completing the questionnaire, the experimenter manipulated the group size 
condition through instructions given to participants. The group size condition used in 
each experimental session was randomly determined prior to conducting the sessions, 
with one session out of every three being either a neutral (the number of 
overestimators and underestimators was unspecified), overestimator-
majority/underestimator-minority, or underestimator-majority/overestimator-minority 
group condition. The actual numbers of overestimators and underestimators in each 
condition were equal. The instructions were as follows: 
For the Neutral Group Condition: 
You will be assigned to a group based on your responses to the estimation 
task for the purposes of our next activity. Results from this type of task have 
shown that some people consistently overestimate the number, weight, 
distance, and time quantities and some people consistently underestimate 
these values. 
For the Majority/Minority Group Condition: 
You will be assigned to a group based on your responses to the estimation 
task for the purposes of our next activity. Results from this type of task have 
shown that some people consistently overestimate the number, weight, 
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distance, and time quantities and some people consistently underestimate 
these values. Results also indicate that 81.2% of college students are 
overestimators (underestimators) and 18.8% will be underestimators 
(overestimators). 
After completing the questionnaire, the assistants returned with an envelope for each 
individual, identified by the four-digit identification number. Each envelope contained 
information that the participant was either an overestimator or an underestimator, the 
trait-rating instrument, a booklet of matrices for the Tajfel (1978) resource allocation 
task, and a post-session questionnaire. To reinforce majority/minority status, a written 
copy of the statement made by the experimenter about the distribution of 
overestimators and underestimators (majority and minority or neutral) was included 
with the information about group assignment and participants were asked to read this. 
Participants were asked to write their four-digit identification number on the trait-
rating task and the first page of the matrices booklet where instructed. The order of 
the trait-rating task and resource allocation task was counterbalanced among sessions. 
The instructions for the Tajfel (1978) resource allocation task were as follows: 
You will now engage in a task that consists of giving additional rewards 
and penalties in real extra credit points to other participants, beyond 
what you have earned just by coming. The identity of the individuals to 
whom you will be assigning these rewards and penalities will remain 
anonymous since everyone is using a four-digit code number. At no point 
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will you be awarding points to or penalizing yourself; you are allotting the 
points to others. At the end of the study, we will notify your class instructor of 
the amount of extra credit to award to each person. 
All participants received extra points beyond what they had been told they would 
receive for their participation, and all participants from the same undergraduate 
psychology class received the same number of points for attending and participating. 
Two examples of matrices, not used in the experiments, were shown to the 
participants, and the nature of the various choices was explained. Upon completion of 
the tasks, participants were asked to place the group assignment information, the trait-
rating score sheet, and the booklet of matrices back in the envelope provided. 
Participants were then asked to complete the post-experiment measure. Answers were 
recorded on scantron sheets. These were then placed in the envelope by the 
participants and collected by the experimenter. 
Dependent Measures 
Trait-rating Task 
As in Thompson and Crocker (1990), participants were presented with 16 traits 
comprising a social dimension (friendly, sincere, trustworthy, considerate, boring, 
rude, self-centered, insensitive) and an intellectual dimension (motivated, ambitious, 
creative, intelligent, stupid, apathetic, uninformed, incompetent). They were 
instructed to rate how true, on a 7-point scale, each of these traits were of an 
anonymous member of the ingroup and an anonymous member of the outgroup. 
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Ratings of ingroup and outgroup members were counterbalanced. Traits were 
presented in the same random order to all participants. 
Resource Allocation Task 
Each page in the Tajfel (1978) resource allocation booklet contained one matrix. 
A matrix consists of 13 pairs of numbers (Appendix B). Each row is preceded by the 
phrase: Member 8244 of Overestimators or Member 2219 of Underestimators: (in 
both instances the four-digit number was fictitious and was varied on each matrix). 
These designations represent anonymous members of the ingroup or the outgroup, 
depending on the group assignment of the participant. Participants indicated their 
choices by circling the set of numbers that they would like to give to the person in 
their group (either overestimators or underestimators) and the person in the other 
group. Choices were confirmed by having participants write the numbers that were 
allotted to each person in the blanks provided on the page. 
Four matrices of each of the following types were contained in the resource 
allocation task booklet. Each matrix type was presented twice in two ways: strategies-
together and strategies-opposed, for a total of 12 matrices. 
1. Matrix Type A compares ingroup favoritism (FAV or MIP + MD) with 
maximum joint profit (MJP). 
2. Matrix Type B compares maximum difference in favor of ingroup (MD) 
with a combination of absolute ingroup profit (MIP) and maximum joint 
profit (MJP). 
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3. Matrix Type C compares parity or fairness, (P) with ingroup favoritism (FAV). 
For example, there are two matrices in each booklet of Matrix Type A strategies-
together, and two matrices in each booklet of Matrix Type A strategies-opposed. In a 
strategies-together matrix of Matrix A: FAV and MJP, choices indicate the joint 
influence of both strategies. When strategies are together, the optimum points of two 
strategies coincide. In a strategies-opposed matrix, participants are forced to make a 
choice that maximizes one strategy, for example maximum ingroup favoritism (FAV), 
at the expense of foregoing the opportunity to maximize another, maximum joint profit 
(MJP). The number pair that allows one to engage in FAV is at the farthest distance 
from the number pair that permits one to engage in MJP. Each pair was presented one 
time with one group designation as the top row and the other group designation as the 
bottom row and one time in the reverse order. The order of matrix presentation was 
randomized within each booklet and varied from one booklet to another. 
Post-Session Questionnaire 
The post-session questionnaire (see Appendix C) included the Heatherton and 
Polivy (1991) state self-esteem scale and four items assessing the degree of ingroup 
identification: (a) I was placed in the correct group, (b) I identified with my group, (c) 
I am not like other members of my group (reverse scored), and (d) I identified with 
the other group (reverse scored). Four items concerning which allocation strategy 
participants were trying to use were included, though unrelated to the current study. 
All items were scored on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). 
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Results 
Trait ratings 
In the current sample, the internal consistency of ratings of the ingroup and 
outgroup as measured by Cronbach's alpha coefficients were both .80. To investigate 
hypothesis la, the positive and negative items for the anonymous ingroup member and 
the anonymous outgroup member, respectively, were summed into single scores by 
subtracting the total negative trait-rating score from the total positive trait-rating score 
to form a composite score for each target. The difference between the ingroup 
composite score and the outgroup composite score was calculated for each participant 
and used as the dependent variable of ingroup favoritism on the trait ratings, with 
higher scores indicating greater ingroup favoritism. The mean score for ratings of the 
ingroup was 15.46, sd = 10.85, while the mean score for ratings of the outgroup was 
10.60, sd = 9.20. Results indicate that, overall, participants displayed ingroup 
favoritism on the trait-rating task, t (306) = 7.41, p <.001, confirming hypothesis la. 
Resource Allocation Task 
To test hypothesis lb, "pull" scores, or the difference in ranks between the 
strategies-opposed and strategies-together versions of the same matrix type, were 
calculated for each participant. A detailed scoring example is provided in Appendix D. 
Ranks represent the number of columns away from the zero point of the matrix that 
the participant has indicated as the chosen allocation. The zero point is that 
combination of points which gives the ingroup member the maximum possible points 
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on the matrix. 
Two pulls are calculated from each matrix type. Since there are two versions of 
each matrix type, a total of six matrix distribution strategy pulls can be obtained: 
Matrix Type A: Pull of FAV on MJP (strategies-opposed) 
Pull of MJP on FAV (strategies-together) 
Matrix Type B: Pull of MD on MIP + MJP (strategies-opposed) 
Pull of MIP + MJP on MD (strategies-together) 
Matrix Type C: Pull of P on FAV (strategies-opposed) 
Pull of FAV onP (strategies-together) 
Pulls range from -12 to +12. To determine which resource allocation strategies 
participants used, the mean pull scores of each matrix type were calculated for each 
participant. Table 1 presents the mean "pulls" of each strategy for each condition in 
the study which were tested for significance using the Wilcoxon matched-pairs tests. 
The test was performed on the difference in mean scores between the opposed and 
together rank scores of each matrix type (see Bourhis et. al., 1994). As shown in 
Table 1, there was a significant pull of FAV on MJP in each condition, indicating a 
tendency for all groups to display ingroup favoritism. In the case of the majority and 
minority conditions, the pull of MJP on FAV was not significant, indicating that 
participants in these conditions did not use the strategy of MJP. All groups displayed 
significant pulls of MD on MIP + MJP, clearly discriminating against one another. 
However, the pull of MIP+MJP on MD is apparently larger. As seen in Table 1, by far 
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Table 1 
Mean "pulls" of subject's matrix distribution strategies 
Neutral Majority Minority 
Matrix 
Strategy 
A: Pull of 
FAV on MJP .79* 2.03* 1.90* 
MJP on FAV .75* .26 .12 
B: Pull of 
MD on MIP+MJP .69* 1.06* 1.44* 
MIP+MJP on MD 2.22* 2.14* 2.41* 
C: Pull of 
P on FAV 8.63* 8.00* 8.09* 
FAV on P 1.20* 1.24* 1.10* 
*p < .01 
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the most significant strategy favored by participants in all groups was parity (P on 
FAV). While hypothesis lb was supported in this sample, equality was the strongest 
and apparently the most common strategy used by participants. 
Authoritarianism and Social Dominance 
In order to examine hypothesis 2, authoritarianism, group size, and 
authoritarianism by group size were entered in regression analyses as predictors of 
ingroup favoritism on the trait-rating composite score and pull scores of each strategy 
type. Authoritarianism did not predict ingroup favoritism on the trait ratings, nor were 
there any interactions with group size. 
When the pull scores of each strategy were used as dependent variables, neither 
the authoritarianism main effect nor the interaction of authoritarianism by group size 
affected pull scores on Matrix A (FAV vs. MJP and MJP vs. FAV) or Matrix B (MD 
vs. MIP+MJP and MIP+MJP vs. MD). There was a main effect for authoritarianism 
on the Matrix C (P vs. FAV) strategies-together pull scores, |3r = -.19, p< .001, 
(higher scores on authoritarianism led to less pull toward parity) but not a significant 
effect of authoritarianism on the FAV vs. P. strategy. Therefore, since the use of 
ingroup favoritism by those higher in authoritarianism was confirmed on only one of 
six tests, and only slightly at that, evidence for hypothesis 2 is weak at best. It may be 
said that authoritarianism does predict one will be less likely to engage in parity, with 
tendency toward ingroup favoritism. 
Hypothesis 3 was tested by entering social dominance, group size, and social 
34 
dominance by group size in regression analyses as predictors of ingroup favoritism on 
the trait-rating composite score and pull scores of each strategy type. No significant 
results occurred when the trait-rating score was used as the dependent variable. With 
regard to the resource allocation task, no effects were found on Matrix A. An 
interaction occurred between social dominance and group size on Matrix B strategies-
opposed (MIP+MJP vs. MD). In this case, SDO in the neutral condition led to pulls 
toward MIP+MJP, |3 = .542, p <.02. There was an interaction of social dominance by 
group size on Matrix C strategies-together (P vs. FAV) pull scores: Social dominance 
orientation in the neutral condition predicted less parity, 0 = -.55, p < .02, while SDO 
in the majority predicted greater parity, 0 = .56, p < .02. 
Ingroup Identification As Mediator 
Reliability analysis indicated items 1 ("I was placed in the correct group") and 
2 ("I identified with my group") were sufficient to accurately ascertain the degree of 
identification with the ingroup, a = .72. Inclusion of the two remaining items lowered 
the alpha. In testing hypothesis 4, two-block stepwise regressions were used in each 
instance where social dominance significantly affected a pull score to determine if 
ingroup identification mediated the relationship. Ingroup identification was entered in 
the first step and SDO was entered in the second step. If the effect of SDO is 
mediated by ingroup identification, it should not enter into the regression in the second 
step. 
In the neutral condition, ingroup identification was uncorrelated, r = -.15, ns, with 
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the Matrix B strategies-opposed score (MIP+MJP vs. MD) and therefore seemed 
unlikely to mediate the effects of social dominance. In the regression analysis, ingroup 
identification did not enter in step one, but social dominance entered in step 2, R = .41, 
pc .001 . 
Social dominance also affected the pull of Matrix C: strategies-together pull score 
(P vs. FAV) in the neutral condition. In this instance, the correlation of ingroup 
identification with the pull of parity on ingroup favoritism was significant, 
r = .21, p < .05. Ingroup identification entered in step one of the two-step regression, 
R = .21, and SDO entered in step two, for a multiple-R of, R = .34, g < .01. The 
zero-order correlation of SDO with the pull score of P vs. FAV of r = .31 was reduced 
only to .28. Therefore, ingroup identification did not mediate the effect of SDO on P 
vs. FAV. 
In the majority condition, the correlation of ingroup identification with the pull 
score of Matrix C: strategies-together (P vs. FAV) was not significant, p = -.09. In 
the regression, ingroup identification did not enter in step one. 
While not hypothesized, a test was also conducted to see if the effects of 
authoritarianism on the Matrix C: strategies-together pull score (P vs. FAV) was 
mediated by ingroup identification for all subjects. Because the correlation between 
this pull score and ingroup identification was not significant, r = .03, it seemed unlikely 
that it would mediate the effects of authoritarianism. In the two-step regression, only 
authoritarianism entered, R = .20, p < .001. Therefore, ingroup indentification did not 
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serve as a mediator between authoritarianism and P vs. FAV. 
Additional analyses 
Post-session scores on the State Self-Esteem Scale (SSES; Heatherton & Polivy, 
1991) were significantly larger than pre-session scores on the SSES, M = 51.9, 
M = 50.53, respectively (t - -1.39, p < .001). In an attempt to replicate McFarland 
and Ageyev's (1992) finding that only high authoritarians used ingroup favoritism for 
the purposes of self-esteem enhancement, correlations were calculated between the 
change in SSES score (pretest - posttest), trait ratings, and pull scores for low (1 sd 
below the mean for this sample), middle (between +\- lsd) and high (lsd above the 
mean for this sample) authoritarians. None of the correlations were significant, 
indicating that neither high authoritarians nor any other subgroup used ingroup 
favoritism for purposes of self-esteem enhancement in this sample. Correlations were 
also calculated between the SSES change score, trait ratings, and pull scores for low, 
middle, and high social dominants. Again, none of the correlations were significant. 
Gender did not prove to be a significant factor on the trait ratings or the resource 
allocation task. And when either trait ratings or pull scores of the resource allocation 
task were used as the dependent variable, there were no significant task order effects. 
Chapter Three 
Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to examine how authoritarianism and social 
dominance affect discrimination in a minimal group setting and to examine whether or 
not group size interacts with these constructs to influence discrimination. The first 
hypothesis, that participants would display ingroup favoritism, was confirmed on both 
trait ratings (Thompson & Crocker, 1990) and Tajfel's (1979) resource allocation task 
(although parity was the strongest strategy used of all those available on the Tajfel 
(1978) matrices). 
Second, it was hypothesized that those higher in authoritarianism would display 
greater ingroup favoritism than those lower in authoritarianism, regardless of group 
size. However, neither authoritarianism nor any interaction between authoritarianism 
and group size significantly affected trait ratings. As for ingroup favoritism on the 
resource allocation task, authoritarianism led to a pull toward favoritism on only one 
of the six matrices and did not interact with group size on any of the tasks. 
The third hypothesis, that social dominance would interact with group size and 
enhance ingroup favoritism and outgroup discrimination for individuals in the majority 
group but lead to reduced levels of ingroup favoritism and outgroup discrimination in 
the minority group size condition, was not supported. Neither social dominance nor 
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its interaction with group size affected trait ratings. With regard to the Tajfel (1978) 
matrices, social dominance led those in the neutral condition to display ingroup 
favoritism and to maximize profit. Contrary to the hypothesis, individuals higher in 
SDO in the majority group size condition engaged in greater parity than favoritism, 
while SDO had no effect upon discrimination in minority groups. 
Finally, it was hypothesized that identification with the ingroup would mediate the 
relationship between SDO and ingroup favoritism in the minority group condition, 
leading those individuals high in SDO to exhibit less identification with the ingroup 
and display less favoritism toward the ingroup. Overall, ingroup identification did not 
mediate the relationship between social dominance and ingroup favoritism on the trait 
ratings or pull scores of the resource allocation task. Within each condition, contrary 
to hypothesis 4, ingroup identification did not mediate the relationship between SDO, 
RWA, and ingroup favoritism on either the trait ratings or the pull scores of the 
resource allocation task. 
The results of this study do not replicate the findings of McFarland and Ageyev 
(1992). Authoritarianism did not lead to greater ingroup favoritism on either task and 
there were no effects as regards self-esteem enhancement. McFarland and Ageyev 
(1992) found that task order was a significant factor in predicting the degree of 
ingroup favoritism displayed by authoritarians, but no such effect was evident in this 
sample. Finally, there were no significant effects of gender or task order. 
Several other minimal group studies report that participants were more likely to 
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use the strategy of parity rather than that of relative gain (Gagnon & Bourhis, 1996; 
Tajfel et al., 1971; Tajfel & Billig, 1974). The fact that participants in this study 
predominantly displayed ingroup favoritism on the trait ratings and parity on the 
resource allocations is perhaps due to the different nature of the tasks. McFarland and 
Ageyev (1992) reported the correlations between trait ratings and both the Tajfel 
(1978) and Brewer and Silver (1978) allocation tasks were only .15 and .05, 
respectively, in their study. In the present study, none of the correlations between the 
trait ratings and the pull scores were significant. Therefore, it seems reasonable to 
assume that participants view the two tasks very differently. In a study by Jones, 
Wood, and Quattrone (1981) concerning perceived group homogeneity, participants 
perceived the outgroup as more homogenous yet attributed more positive 
characteristics to the ingroup. They suggested that while individuals are more attune 
to the variability within their own group, they nevertheless "prefer" their group and 
thus rate ingroup members more favorably as a whole. It seems likely ingroup 
favoritism on the trait ratings reflects this preference for one's own group and the 
desire to attribute positive characteristics to oneself. 
Participants' greater tendency to award points based on the strategy of parity on 
the Tajfel (1978) matrices may have been due to the timing and methods of 
recruitment. Participants were enrolled in the second semester of the school year and 
thus had ample opportunity to have formed acquaintances and friendships with other 
classmates. Therefore, the competition for resources which typically manifests itself 
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when participants are assigned different group designations in the minimal group 
paradigm may have been overridden by the desire to reward not only themselves but 
also their friends. Participants were allowed to select the most convenient time for 
them to attend experimental sessions at the time of recruitment rather than being 
randomly assigned to a session by the experimenter. Groups of friends may have 
selected times to come together, thus making it more likely that they would attempt to 
avoid favoritism for one group over another. 
The resource allocation task is a more impersonal measure of ingroup favoritism. 
Consequently, individuals can display greater equality without implying anything about 
their own or other's personal characteristics. To date, only this study and McFarland 
and Ageyev (1992) have compared discrimination on the two types of measures. 
Studies that examine how participants think about these two measures may answer this 
question. 
The limited significant results with regard to the hypotheses are by no means 
discouraging, especially in light of a study by Pratto, Shih, and Orton, (1997). These 
researchers found no significant SDO differences in group discrimination using the 
resource allocation measures of Brewer and Silver (1978) when the group context was 
ambiguous or when there was a group threat that drew attention away from the 
minimal group distinctions. In these situations, participants allocated points using the 
joint gain or equality strategies more than the strategy of maximum ingroup gain. It 
wasn't until the minimal group distinction was made highly salient or a group threat 
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that drew attention to group distinctions was introduced that people high in SDO 
responded with greater discrimination. 
The only distinction made in the present study was group size. It was thought 
individiuals higher in SDO's might be sensitive to the implied difference in status that 
results from being in a majority vs. minority. Apparently, group size alone does not 
provide enough intergroup context to affect the responses of high SDO's. Future 
studies that incorporate a threat to the group's image or power differences between 
the groups, in addition to differences in group size, may result in greater differences in 
ingroup favoritsm vs. outgroup discrimination between those high or low in social 
dominance. In fact, Sidanius and Pratto, (1999) and Pratto et al. (1997) have now 
illustrated that it is the combination of SDO with conditions of group membership 
salience or group threat, beliefs that provide individuals with moral and intellectual 
justification for either hierarchy-enhancing or hierarchy-attenuating practices (called 
legitimizing myths, see Sidanidius & Pratto, 1999), and/or social roles, that "work in 
concert as a system to sustain group inequality (p. 36)". 
Likewise, a stronger group context may be necessary for identification with the 
ingroup to influence high SDO's in minority groups to identify less with their own 
group and display favoritism to the majority outgroup. For example, among the real 
groups in Levin and Sidanius' (1999) study the variables of culture, history, how long 
the status differences have existed, and religious background no doubt impact the 
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strength of identification with the ingroup. Studies that make distinctions like these 
salient in a minimal group setting would only serve to further our knowledge of the 
importance of identification with the ingroup to displays of ingroup or outgroup 
favoritism. 
It has been established that authoritarianism and social dominance are two 
independent, major predictors of ethnocentrism, though these results are correlational, 
drawn almost entirely from questionnaire studies. As such, they cannot show that 
authoritarianism and social dominance actually cause prejudice rather than being 
merely related to it. In addition, the questionnaire studies do little to explain how each 
of these induce prejudice or discrimination. The beauty of the minimal group paradigm 
is the way it permits a closer examination of the factors influencing discrimination, 
enabling us to discern who discriminates, under what conditions discrimination occurs, 
and how prejudice is manifested. Clearly, discrimination between real groups is 
influenced by individual differences and situational components. The minimal group 
paradigm is a useful tool in social psychology's attempt to understand the nature and 
manifestation of prejudice. 
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Appendix A 
A Survey of Attitudes and Beliefs 
The following questions ask for your opinions on a wide range of issues. Your 
participation is voluntary, and your responses will be kept private. This study is being 
conducted by Suzanne J. Hillin and Dr. Sam McFarland of the Department of 
Psychology, Western Kentucky University. 
In completing the questionnaire, it is important that you: 
Make no marks on the questionnaire. These will be reused. 
Write the last four digits of your social security number (not your name) 
on the space marked "Name" on the scantron sheets. This will enable us to 
keep your responses on all tasks together. 
Respond to every question. If you change an answer, erase cleanly. 
Mark your answers darkly with a pencil on the scantron sheets. 
Please read each statement and rate your agreement or disagreement. Please mark the 
appropriate letter on the answer sheet using the following scale: 
A = I strongly disagree with this statement. 
B = I generally disagree with this statement. 
C = I am undecided or neutral toward this statement. 
D = I generally agree with this statement. 
E = I strongly agree with this statement. 
1. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups. 
2. In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other 
groups. 
3. It's OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others. 
4. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups. 
5. If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems. 
6. It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups 
are at the bottom. 
7. Inferior groups should stay in their place. 
8. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place. 
9. It would be good if groups could be equal. 
10. Group equality should be our ideal. 
11. All groups should be given an equal chance in life. 
12. We should do what we can do to equalize conditions for different groups. 
13. I support increased social equality. 
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A = I strongly disagree with this statement. 
B = I generally disagree with this statement. 
C = I am undecided or neutral toward this statement. 
D = I generally agree with this statement. 
E = I strongly agree with this statement. 
14. We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally. 
15. We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible. 
16. No one group should dominate society. 
17. It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government 
and religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are 
trying to create doubt in people's minds. 
18. It would be best for everyone if the proper authorities censored magazines and 
movies to keep trashy material away from the youth. 
19. There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse. 
20. The facts on crime, sexual immorality, and the recent public disorders all show 
we have to crack down harder on deviant groups and troublemakers if we are 
going to save our moral standards and preserve law and order. 
21. There is nothing immoral or sick about somebody's being a homosexual. 
22. Some of the worst people in our country nowadays are those who do not 
respect our flag, our leaders, and the normal way things are supposed to be 
done. 
23. In these troubled times laws have to be enforced without mercy, especially 
when dealing with the agitators and revolutionaries who are stirring things up. 
24. Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no 
doubt every bit as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly. 
25. There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps. 
26. The real keys to the "good life" are obedience, discipline, and sticking to the 
straight and narrow. 
27. It is best to treat dissenters with leniency and an open mind, since new ideas 
are the lifeblood of progressive change. 
28. The biggest threat to our freedom comes from the Communists and their kind, 
who are out to destroy religion, ridicule patriotism, corrupt the youth, and in 
general undermine our whole way of life. 
29. If we don't watch out, Asians will control our economy and we will be their 
cheap workers. 
30. We should take in more refugees (Asians, Africans, Bosnians, etc.) fleeing 
from repressive governments. 
31. Arabs are too emotional, and they don't fit well into our country. 
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A = I strongly disagree with this statement. 
B = I generally disagree with this statement. 
C = I am undecided or neutral toward this statement. 
D = I generally agree with this statement. 
E = I strongly agree with this statement 
32. It is good to live in a country where there are a growing number of minorities, 
such as Blacks, Asians and Hispanics. 
33. "Foreign" religions like Buddhism, Hinduism, and Islam are just as good as 
Christianity, all things considered. 
34. The Japanese are still sly and untrustworthy, just as they were before the war. 
35. As a group, Indians are naturally lazy, dishonest, and lawless. 
36. It is simply a waste of time to train some races for good jobs; they simply don't 
have the drive and determination it takes to learn a complicated skill. 
37. There is nothing wrong with intermarriage among the races. 
38. It is a sad fact that many minorities have been persecuted in our country, and 
some are still treated very unfairly. 
39. The more we can let people from all over the world into our country, the 
better. 
40. It is probably still in the nature of Russians to want to expand and dominate. 
41. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me. 
42. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view. 
43. Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having 
problems. 
44. I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision. 
45. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel protective towards them. 
46. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look 
from their perspective. 
47. Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal. 
48. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to 
other people's arguments. 
49. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much 
pity for them. 
50. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen. 
51. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them 
both. 
52. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person. 
53. When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a 
while. 
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A = I strongly disagree with this statement. 
B = I generally disagree with this statement. 
C = I am undecided or neutral toward this statement. 
D = :
 I generally agree with this statement. 
E = I strongly agree with this statement 
54. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their 
place. 
55. I feel confident about my abilities. 
56. I am worried about whether I am regarded as a success or failure. 
57. I feel frustrated or rattled about my performance. 
58. I feel that I am having trouble understanding things that I read. 
59. I feel self-conscious. 
60. I feel as smart as others. 
61. I feel displeased with myself. 
62. I am worried about what other people think of me. 
63. I feel confident that I understand things. 
64. I feel inferior to others at this moment. 
65. I feel concerned about the impression I am making. 
66. I feel that I have less scholastic ability right now than others. 
67. I feel like I'm not doing well. 
68. I am worried about looking foolish. 
69. My ethnic group is: 
a. Caucasian b. Black c. Hispanic d. Asian e. Other 
70. My gender is: 
a. male b. female 
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Sample Matrices 
In the following sets of tables, please circle the set of two numbers (one over the 
other) that you would like to give to the person in your group (either overestimator or 
underestimator) and the person in the other group. When you have made your choice, 
confirm it by writing the numbers you allotted to each person in the blanks below. The 
numbers represent the number of points that each person will gain. 
For example: 
Member 8244 1 2 4 6 8 10 
of Overestimators 
Member 2219 22 20 18 16 14 12 
of Underestimators 
Member 8244 of Overestimators: 
Member 2219 of Underestimators: 
Matrix Type A strategies together: 
Member 9488 25 23 21 19 17 15 13 11 9 7 5 3 1 
Of Overestimators 
Member 2405 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
of Underestimators 
Member 9488 of Overestimators 
Member 2405 of Underestimators 
Matrix Type A strategies opposed: 
Member 1924 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 
of Underestimators 
Member 2422 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 
of Overestimators 
12 14 16 18 20 22 
10 8 
Member 1924 of Underestimators: 
Member 2422 of Overestimators: 
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Matrix Type B strategies together: 
Member 2205 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 
of Overestimators 
Member 3622 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
of Underestimators 
Member 2205 of Overestimators: 
Member 3622 of Underestimators: 
Matrix Type B strategies opposed: 
Member 6651 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 
of Overestimators 
Member 2298 25 23 21 19 17 15 13 11 9 7 5 3 1 
of Underestimators 
Member 6651 of Overestimators: 
Member 2298 of Underestimators: 
Matrix Type C strategies together: 
Member 2340 28 27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 
of Underestimators 
Member 3165 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
of Overestimators 
Member 2340 of Underestimators: 
Member 3165 of Overestimators: 
Matrix Type C strategies opposed 
Member 2429 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
of Overestimators 
Member 3935 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 
of Underestimators 
Member 2429 of Overestimators: 
Member 3935 of Underestimates: 
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Post-Session Questionnaire 
These questions are asked for the purpose of assessing your experience in the session. 
Your responses will be kept private and anonymous. In completing the questionnaire, 
it is important that you: 
• Write the last four digits of your social security number on the space marked 
"Name" on the scantron sheet. This will enable us to keep your responses on all 
tasks together. 
• Respond to every question. Mark your answers clearly. Please erase cleanly. 
You are asked to read each statement and rate your agreement or disagreement. 
Please mark the appropriate letter on the scantron sheet using the following scale: 
A = I strongly disagree with this statement. 
B = I generally disagree with this statement. 
C = I am undecided or neutral toward this statement. 
D = I generally agree with this statement. 
E = I strongly agree with this statement. 
1. I was placed in the correct group. 
2. I identified with my group. 
3. I am not like other members of my group. 
4. I identified with the other group. 
5. I feel confident about my abilities. 
6. I am worried about whether I am regarded as a success or failure. 
7. I feel frustrated or rattled about my performance. 
8. I feel that I am having trouble understanding things that I read. 
9. I feel self-conscious. 
10. I feel as smart as others. 
11. I feel displeased with myself. 
12. I am worried about what other people think of me. 
13. I feel confident that I understand things. 
14. I feel inferior to others at this moment. 
15. I feel concerned about the impression I am making. 
16. I feel that I have less scholastic ability right now than others. 
17. I feel like I'm not doing well. 
18. I am worried about looking foolish. 
19. I tried to award equal points to both groups. 
20. I tried to give more points to the member of my group than the member of the 
other group. 
21. I tried to give more points to the member of the other group than the member of 
my group. 
22. I tried to maximize the number of points for both groups. 
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Scoring Sheet for Calculating Pull Scores from the Tajfel Matrices 
Matrix Choices Completed by a Member of Overestimators (OV) 
(adapted fromBourhis, et. al., 1994) 
Condition Participant Number 
Matrix Type Strategies Together 
(T) 
Strategies Opposed 
(0) 
Pull Scores 
Type A: Pull of FAV on MJP Pull of FAV on MJP Pull of FAV on MJP: 4 
FAV(MIP+MD)vs. 
MJP 
Group OV: 25... 1 
Group UE: 7 19 
*Zero point at 25/7 
Matrix chosen: 17/11 
Rank score(T) = 4 
Group OV: 19...7 
Group UE: 1 25 
*Zero point at 7/25 
Matrix chosen: 15/9 
Rank score (O) = 8 
0 - T = 
8 - 4 = 4 
Pull of MJP on FAV: 0 
( 1 2 - 0 ) - T = 
( 1 2 - 8 ) - ( 4 ) = 0 
Type B: 
MD vs. MIP+MJP 
Pull of MD on MIP + 
MJP 
Group OV: 1...25 
Group UE: 7 19 
*Zero point at 25/19 
Matrix chosen: 21/17 
Rank score (T) = 2 
Pull of MD on MIP + 
MJP 
Group OV: 19...7 
Group UE: 25 1 
*Zero point at 19/25 
Matrix chosen: 8/3 
Rank score (O) = 11 
Pull of MD on MIP + 
MJP: 9 
O —T = 
1 1 - 2 = 9 
Pull of MIP + MJP on 
MD: -1 
( 1 2 - 0 ) - ( T ) = 
( 1 2 - 11) — 2 = -1 
Type C: Pull of P on FAV Pull of P on FAV Pull o fP on FAV: 7 
P vs. FAV(MIP + MD) Group OV: 4... 16 
Group UE: 28 16 
*Zero point at 16/16 
Matrix chosen: 16/16 
Rank score (T) = 0 
Group OV: 16...28 
Group UE: 16 4 
*Zero point at 28/4 
Matrix chosen: 21/11 
Rank score (O) = 7 
O —T = 
7 - 0 = 7 
Pull of FAV on P: 5 
( 1 2 - 0 ) - ( T ) = 
(12 - 7) - 0 = 5 
Note: OV=overestimators UE=underestimators 
*The zero points identified for each of the strategies presented on this table are only relevant for the 
particular format presentation of the Tajfel matrices used in this experiment. Other combinations of 
matrices (right-to-left and/or top-to-bottom reversals of rows and columns result in different zero points 
reflecting new configurations of strategies-together and strategies-opposed combinations. 
